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Introduction	
	It	has	become	fashionable	to	talk	of	the	advanced	democracies	having	entered	a	phase	of	‘post-truth	politics’	(Lockie	2017,	Rose	2017,	Suiter	2016).	The	rise	of	populist	and	anti-elite	movements,	and	the	rejection	of	basic	principles	of	reason	and	veracity	characteristic	of	much	of	their	political	discourse,	has	sparked	a	good	deal	of	media	interest,	although	so	far	little	in	the	way	of	systematic	
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scholarly	attention.	The	concept	of	‘post-truth’	can	be	traced	back	to	Ralph	Keyes’	broader	social	critique	of	dishonesty	and	deception	(2004),	but	more	recently	the	idea	has	begun	to	be	applied	to	politics,	albeit	mainly	outside	the	academic	sphere.	Post-truth	politics	is	defined	variously	as	a	focus	on	‘politics’	rather	than	concrete	‘policy’	(Roberts	2010),	a	mistrust	of	authoritative	‘experts’	(Drezner	2016)	and	even	a	brazen	willingness	to	lie	and	the	straightforward	refusal	to	accept	clearly	documented	facts	(The	Economist	2016).	The	election	of	Donald	Trump	to	the	American	Presidency	and	the	successful	campaign	to	leave	the	EU	in	the	United	Kingdom	are	perhaps	the	two	most	widely	discussed	examples	of	the	genre.		 	It	is	tempting	to	classify	these	instances	of	post-truth	politics	under	the	familiar	rubric	of	populism.	And	 indeed,	 there	are	many	good	reasons	 for	analysing	the	likes	of	Trump,	former	UKIP	leader	Nigel	Farage	and	others	in	this	way	(Mudde	2004).	 Their	 rhetorical	 utterances	 can	be	understood	 as	 typical	 of	 a	 particular	mode	of	reasoning	(Laclau	2005)	or	indeed	as	a	form	of	politics	in	itself	that	more	or	less	manifests	itself	in	toto	as	a	distinctive	mode	of	communication	(Jagers	and	Walgrave	2007).	However,	our	suggestion	here	is	that	the	apparent	loosening	of	the	 relationship	between	political	 rhetoric	and	 ‘truth’	 (or	put	another	way,	 the	diminishing	importance	of	anchoring	political	utterances	in	relation	to	verifiable	facts)	is	a	much	broader	phenomenon	that	is	not	confined	to	the	spaces	inhabited	by	populist	politicians.	Nor	is	it	a	matter	of	mainstream	political	discourse	taking	on	a	more	populist	form	or	simply	adopting	the	standard	tropes	of	populism.	In	this	paper	we	treat	these	forms	of	political	utterance	as	consequential,	and	use,	by	way	of	 illustration,	key	debates	in	contemporary	macroeconomic	policy	around	
 3	
public	 debt	 and	 budget	 deficits.	 So-called	 ‘austerity’	 policies	 have	 been	widely	adopted	in	the	face	of	much	academic	opposition,	and	have	survived	despite	this	opposition	being	borne	out	by	the	expected	poor	results	(Blyth	2013).	Following	Harry	Frankfurt	(2005),	we	suggest	that	the	rise	and	resilience	of	failed	ideas	in	the	political	sphere	is	usefully	understood	through	their	operation	as	‘bullshit’.	We	go	further	to	suggest	(a)	that	the	simultaneous	rise	of	bullshit	in	political	discourse	and	the	rise	of	austerity	as	the	dominant	feature	of	macroeconomic	policy	is	not	coincidental	 and	 (b)	 that	 the	 rise	 of	 bullshit	 (and	 thus	 of	 austerity	 policies)	 is	rooted	in	the	broader	hollowing	out	of	western	democratic	politics.			Frankfurt	 began	 his	 essay	On	 Bullshit	 with	 the	words	 ‘one	 of	 the	most	 salient	features	of	our	culture	is	that	there	is	so	much	bullshit.	Everyone	knows	this.	Each	of	us	contributes	his	share’	(2005:	1).	It	is	our	contention	that	this	broad	statement	is	 of	 ever	 growing	 importance	 to	 the	 political	 sphere	 too.	 In	 advanced	democracies,	 political	 discourse	 is	 increasingly	 dominated	 by	 what	 Frankfurt	defines	 as	 ‘bullshit’:	 deceptive	 misrepresentation,	 short	 of	 lying,	 which	 is	indifferent	 to	 facts.	 Politicians’	 defence	 of	 spending	 cuts	 as	 a	 way	 out	 of	 the	economic	downturn,	a	notion	rejected	by	almost	the	entire	economics	profession,	revolves	 around	homely	 notions	 of	 ‘tightening	 belts’	 and	 ‘putting	 our	 house	 in	order’.	It	is	frequently	accompanied	by	claims	that	‘there	is	no	magic	money	tree’,	despite	 the	widespread	 use	 of	 central	 bank	money	 creation	 since	 the	 financial	crisis.			
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Why	 the	 escalation	 of	 bullshit	 in	 our	 political	 life?	 This	 paper	 argues	 that	 the	growth	of	bullshit	is	a	real	phenomenon	that	is	best	understood	as	a	consequence	of	the	sidelining	of	conventional	political	ideologies,	and	of	the	organizations	that	have	 traditionally	 articulated	 and	 promoted	 them:	 formally	 organized	 political	parties.	This	decline	is	in	turn	a	feature	of	the	entrenching	of	neoliberalism	in	the	advanced	democracies,	which	has	tended	to	individualize	political	action,	placing	a	heavy	cognitive	burden	on	citizens	trying	to	make	sense	of	the	political	world,	whilst	 severely	 constraining	 the	 range	 of	 political	 actions	 that	 democratic	institutions	are	permitted	to	pursue.	In	the	‘void’	(Mair	2013)	left	by	ideologically	coherent	political	parties,	a	set	of	new	opportunistic	political	actors	have	emerged,	performing	 the	 classic	 function	 of	 legitimating	 democratic	 government	 and	communicating	with	 citizens,	 but	without	 the	 parties’	 intellectual	 and	 political	substance.	The	result	is	a	political	discourse	suffused	with	bullshit.		The	paper	proceeds	as	follows.	First	we	outline	Frankfurt’s	conceptualization	of	bullshit	 and	 apply	 it	 to	 the	 political	 sphere.	 We	 then	 connect	 this	 concept	 of	bullshit	to	the	decline	of	mass	parties	and	the	emergence	of	a	new,	depoliticized	form	of	democratic	governance.	We	illustrate	these	trends	through	a	short	case	study	of	the	debate	about	fiscal	policy	in	the	UK,	described	memorably	by	Stiglitz	(2010)	as	‘deficit	fetishism’.	The	final	section	concludes.		
The	Concept	of	Political	Bullshit		As	a	theoretical	starting	point,	we	assume	that	what	is	said	in	the	sphere	of	politics	is	consequential	for	political	outcomes.	Rhetorical	utterances	matter	because	they	have	the	capacity	to	shape	actors’	problem	and	solution	sets	and,	more	broadly,	
 5	
they	have	the	capacity	to	construct	 the	world	 in	particular	ways,	which	 in	turn	define	 the	 parameters	 of	 what	 is	 both	 politically	 possible	 and	 normatively	appropriate	(Hay	2004).	 	A	now	huge	corpus	of	 ideational	scholarship	explores	the	many	and	varied	ways	in	which	ideas	-	propositions	about	the	social	world	–intended	to	guide	human	behaviour	–	‘matter’	in	the	political	sphere	(see	Abelal,	Blyth	and	Parsons	2010,	Béland		 and	Cox	2010).	Politics	may	be	seen	 less	as	a	domain	of	competing	fixed	interests	and	more	as	a	space	in	which	ideas	vie	with	one	another	to	actively	constitute	those	interests	(Blyth	2003).	 Ideas	may	form	the	 backdrop	 to	 political	 debates,	 creating	 broad	 intersubjective	 premises	 that	define	 the	scope	of	what	 is	deemed	 to	be	 technically	possible	or	 (for	example)	socially	 just.	 Ideas	may	have	particular	salience	 in	moments	of	uncertainty	and	crisis	where	 there	 is	 a	heightened	demand	 for	new	problem	and	 solution	 sets.	Communicative	 discourse	 and	 political	 rhetoric	 are	 not	merely	 epiphenomena,	but	potentially	active	shapers	of	social	reality.				One	of	the	most	interesting	puzzles	to	emerge	of	late	is	the	question	of	how	‘bad	ideas’	(or	with	Quiggin	[2010]	and	Krugman	[2012],	‘zombie	ideas’)	emerge	and	survive	within	the	policy	process,	and	it	 is	here	that	the	concept	of	bullshit	has	particular	utility.	Bad	 ideas	may	be	defined	as	 claims	about	 the	world	 that	 are	easily	refuted	or	contested	by	appealing	to	an	archive	of	authoritative	knowledge	(Schrad	 2010).	 Salient	 examples	 include	 young	 earth	 creationism	 and	 climate	change	denial.	What	makes	 these	particular	bad	 ideas	worthy	of	 study	 is	 their	strong	traction	in	policy	discourse	despite	their	manifest	lack	of	scientific	veracity	(Matthijs	 and	 Blyth	 2017).	 Additionally,	 both	 creationism	 and	 climate	 change	denial	are	rather	more	than	residual	artefacts	of	ignorance	or	(at	best)	pseudo-
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science	 (Gordin	 2012).	 Rather,	 they	 have	 been	 active	 shapers	 of	 public	 policy	debate,	most	obviously	–	though	not	exclusively	–	in	the	United	States.	That	such	ideas	 are	 kept	 in	 circulation	 through	 (for	 example)	well	 orchestrated	 lobbying	(Jaques	et	al	2008)	or	via	 the	exploitation	of	media	balancing	norms	(M.	Berry	2016,	 Mooney	 2004)	 is	 well	 established.	What	 is	 also	 striking	 –	 again	 a	 solid	research	 finding	 –	 is	 the	 extent	 to	 which	 citizens	 in	 democratic	 societies	 are	themselves	active	carriers	of	misinformation	(Kuklinski	et	al	2000).	For	example,	there	 are	 well-established	 discrepancies	 between	 public	 perceptions	 of	immigration	levels	in	the	UK	and	the	statistical	realities	(Duffy	and	Frere-Smith	2014).		The	same	is	true	of	exaggerated	public	perceptions	about	levels	of	benefit	fraud	(Mulheirn	2013)	or	the	claim	often	made	by	UK	politicians	(on	both	sides	of	the	political	spectrum)	that	there	are	some	communities	in	Britain	where	three	or	four	generations	have	never	had	a	job	(MacDonald,	Shildrick	and	Furlong	2014).			Claims	such	as	these	–	that	Britain	is	overwhelmed	by	immigrants,	who	in	turn	become	a	major	fiscal	drain	on	the	Exchequer,	which,	in	any	case,	is	suffering	from	levels	 of	 domestic	 benefit	 fraud	 (that	 eclipse	 revenues	 lost	 through	 forms	 tax	evasion/avoidance)	 rooted	 in	 a	 culture	of	worklessness	 and	 sloth	 amongst	 the	poorest	members	 of	UK	 society	 –	 can	 all	 be	 refuted	with	 an	 appeal	 to	 various	sources	of	hard	data.	The	puzzle	becomes,	simply,	why	do	such	claims	continue	to	have	currency	despite	being	 falsehoods.	Frankfurt’s	answer	 is	 that	 the	 truth	 in	relation	to	such	utterances	is	irrelevant.	This	is	because	these	claims	are	not	lies;	rather	they	are	bullshit.			
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Thus	Frankfurt	makes	a	key	distinction	between	lying	and	bullshitting.	A	lie	is	a	form	 of	 utterance	 that	 pays	 heed	 to	 the	 truth.	 To	 speak	 a	 lie	 is	 to	 knowingly	pronounce	 a	 falsehood.	 To	 bullshit,	 on	 the	 other	 hand,	 is	 to	 practice	 a	 type	 of	speech	act	 that	 is	not	 triangulated	 in	 relation	 to	 the	 truth	 and	which	proceeds	without	effective	concern	for	the	veracity	of	the	claim	in	question.	As	Frankfurt	puts	it:			 Telling	 a	 lie	 is	 an	 act	 with	 a	 sharp	 focus.	 It	 is	 designed	 to	 insert	 a	particular	falsehood	at	a	specific	point	in	a	set	or	system	of	beliefs,	in	order	to	avoid	the	consequences	of	having	that	point	occupied	by	the	truth.	This	requires	a	degree	of	craftsmanship,	in	which	the	teller	of	the	lie	submits	to	objective	constraints	imposed	by	what	he	takes	to	be	the	truth.	The	liar	is	inescapably	concerned	with	truth-values.	(Frankfurt	2005:	51)		A	 lie	 is	 a	 constrained	 form	 of	 speech	 act,	 whereas	 the	 bullshitter	 is	 afforded	considerably	more	 freedom	 to	make	 claims	 in	 relation	 to	 the	 real	world.	 In	 its	purest	form,	it	is	not	possible	to	submit	bullshit	to	adjudication	in	a	court	of	truth	where	the	claim	is	straightforwardly	tested	against	the	facts.	Ideal-typical	bullshit	is	 immune	 to	 any	 attempt	 to	 scrutinize	 a	 claim	 against	 the	 empirical	 record.	Confronting	 the	 bullshitter	 with	 ‘the	 facts’	 is	 unlikely	 to	 be	 a	 successful	argumentative	strategy.	This,	in	a	nutshell,	is	what	makes	bullshit	so	much	more	dangerous	and	socially	corrosive	than	lying.			
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Of	course,	much	relies	on	the	relationship	between	the	supply	of	and	the	demand	for	bullshit.	If	Donald	Trump	is	treated	as	the	archetypical	bullshitter	(Heer	2015),	then	we	also	need	to	know	something	about	his	audience	and	the	mechanisms	by	which	unverifiable	 nonsense	 becomes	 the	 basis	 of	 a	 distinctive	 politics.	 Extant	research	on	the	question	of	receptivity	to	bullshit	tends	to	place	a	high	premium	on	the	ways	in	which	the	internet	has	been	fundamental	to	not	only	democratizing	the	distribution	of	information	and	knowledge,	but	also	increasing	‘our	access	to	unreliable	 information’	 (Barr	2015).	 	Research	also	 suggests	 that	 the	appeal	of	vacuous	statements	tends	to	correlate	with	lower	levels	of	education,	belief	in	the	paranormal,	acceptance	of	alternative	medicine	and	so	on	(Pennycook	et	al	2015).			Frankfurt	himself	speculates	on	why	bullshit	has	become	more	prevalent	of	late.	He	 suggests,	 first,	 that	 bullshitting	 is	 common	 in	 public	 situations	 where	 the	speaker	is	required	to	pronounce	on	matters	where	they	do	not	have	expertise	(2005:	 63).	 The	 transformation	 of	 expertise	 and	 its	 key	 avatar	 ‘the	 expert’	 is	another	 topic,	 but	 there	 are	 some	 obvious	 links	 with	 Tetlock’s	 well-known	discovery	 that	 ‘experts’	 are	 spectacularly	bad	at	making	 reliable	predictions	 in	precisely	those	fields	in	which	they	claim	professional	expertise	(Tetlock	2005).	Moreover,	Frankfurt	associates	the	probable	rise	of	bullshit	with	‘the	widespread	conviction	that	it	is	the	responsibility	of	a	citizen	in	a	democracy	to	have	opinions	about	everything,	or	at	 least	everything	that	pertains	to	the	conduct	of	his	[sic]	country’s	affairs’	(2005:	64-65).	He	also	spends	the	final	 few	pages	of	his	essay	implying	(though	not	arguing	through)	that	the	rise	of	relativist	(or	‘antirealist’)	conceptions	of	truth	has	been	an	important	determinant	of	the	rise	of	bullshit	in	public	and	private	discourse	(2005:	64-67).		
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	At	this	point	it	is	worth	dwelling	briefly	on	the	relationship	between	‘truth’	and	post-truth	 politics	 (where	 bullshit	 flourishes).	 It	 should	 be	 clear	 from	 the	foregoing	 that	 we	 are	 interested	 in	 how	 certain	 forms	 of	 rhetoric	 give	 rise	 to	particular	political	outcomes.	In	the	political	sphere,	truth	is	typically	contested,	constructed	and	subject	to	 framing	strategies	(Enfield	2017).	As	Enfield	(2017)	goes	on	to	argue,	politics	is	never	a	matter	of	establishing	the	precise	veracity	of	a	claim	or	 of	 using	 the	 polity	 as	 an	 area	 for	 settling	 truth	 in	 a	 rational-scientific	sense.	The	objective	truth	of	a	statement	is	less	important	than	the	consequences	of	 widespread	 acceptance	 of	 the	 statement.	 In	 Arendt’s	 ideal	 typical	 space	 of	politics	-	a	space	of	‘factual	truth’	–	political	judgment	emerges	from	the	interplay	of	alternative	perspectives	(Arendt	1967).	At	the	same	time	this	civic	discourse	operates	within	the	extra-political	(scientific)	context	of	‘rational	truth’.	Thus	we	should	expect	–	as	a	feature	of	normal	politics	–	an	issue	like	climate	change	to	be	treated	very	differently	in	the	respective	domains	of	‘factual’	and	‘rational’	truth.	This	means	that	bullshit	claims	and	bullshitting	political	actors	could	be	present	in	any	democratic	political	 formation.	As	 such,	we	are	not	arguing	 that	politics	before	the	recent	period	was	not	vulnerable	to	bullshit,	but	we	do	want	to	explore	the	 idea	 that	 bullshit	 as	 a	mode	 of	 political	 expression	 has	 become	 a	 defining	characteristic	 of	 recent	 politics	 in	 advanced	 democracies.	 This	 emergence	 of	bullshit	 is	perhaps	explained	by	 two	phenomena:	 the	erosion	of	 the	contextual	linkage	between	factual	and	rational	truth	(Weyn	2017),	and	the	weakening	of	the	institutional	pre-requisites	of	Arendtian	political	practice.			
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Our	argument,	developed	in	the	next	section,	is	to	suggest	that	the	explanation	for	the	 proliferation	 of	 bullshit	 may	 indeed	 reside	 in	 key	 transformations	 in	 the	character	 of	 democratic	 politics.	 However,	 we	 take	 a	 rather	 different	 line	 to	Frankfurt	 (or	 indeed	 to	 some	 of	 the	 psychological	 research	 on	 bullshit)	 by	associating	the	proliferation	of	bullshit	with	the	hollowing	out	of	democratic	party	politics	 in	 advanced	 capitalist	 democracies,	 thereby	 downgrading	 explanations	that	place	the	burden	upon	technological	change	pure	and	simple.	We	agree	with	Frankfurt	that	the	rise	of	bullshit	is	associated	with	certain	epistemic	shifts,	but	rather	than	focus	on	the	postmodern	turn	(as	he	seems	inclined	to	do),	we	focus	instead	 on	 the	 particular	 role	 played	 by	 neoliberal	 rationalities	 in	 normalizing	bullshit	as	a	mode	of	expression	within	political	discourse.			
The	Decline	of	Parties	and	the	Rise	of	Bullshit	There	are	abundant	examples	of	political	bullshit,	but	our	interest	in	the	concept	was	 sparked	 by	 the	 remarkable	 and	 counter-intuitive	 success	 of	 the	 idea	 of	‘austerity’	 in	 the	 aftermath	 of	 the	 financial	 crisis	 (Blyth	 2013;	 C.	 Berry	 2016).	Despite	an	overwhelming	consensus	amongst	professional	economists	that	fiscal	retrenchment	 in	 the	 context	 of	 monetary	 policy	 at	 the	 zero	 lower	 bound	 will	inevitably	prolong	an	economic	downturn,	political	appeals	to	‘tighten	belts’	and	cut	back	on	wasteful	spending	have	met	with	widespread	popular	approval.	Not	only	 has	 public	 opinion	 been	 inconsistent	 with	 the	 state	 of	 knowledge	 in	economics,	which	is	in	itself	unremarkable,	but	it	has	not	evolved	as	expected	in	response	 to	 the	 very	 slow,	 and	 in	 some	 cases	 non-existent,	 recovery	 from	 the	financial	crisis.	Despite	half	a	decade	of	austerian	policies	 leading	to	stagnation	and	at	best	pallid	growth,	appeals	to	belt-tightening	remain	electorally	powerful.	
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Even	 where	 governments	 have	 been	 punished	 for	 presiding	 over	 economic	slumps,	 public	 opinion	 has	 remained	 broadly	 supportive	 of	 the	 broad	 idea	 of	austerity	(Pew	2013:	Ch.1,	Q33).		The	success	of	austerity	discourse	challenges	conventional	understandings	of	how	democratic	 politics	 interacts	 with	 economic	 policy.	 Conventional	 political	economy	 reasoning	 tells	 us	 that	 voters	 will	 reward	 governments	 that	 deliver	growth,	and	that	politicians	will	avoid	tax	rises	and	spending	cuts	because	of	the	electoral	 costs	 associated	 with	 them.	 In	 line	 with	 this	 thinking,	 over	 the	 past	quarter	 century	 or	 so	 economic	 policy-making	 in	 advanced	 democracies	 has	become	 increasingly	 technocratic	 and	 insulated	 from	 political	 pressure.	Independent	 (and	 in	 the	Eurozone	 countries,	 supranational)	 central	banks	and	constitutionalized	 fiscal	constraints	ensure	that	 impartial	experts	can	make	the	right	 decisions	 about	 policy	without	 being	 influenced	 by	 popular	 demands	 for	unsustainable	growth.	The	assumption	underlying	these	institutions	is	that	voters	instinctively	reject	austerity,	preferring	instead	credit-	and	deficit-fuelled	growth	in	the	short-run,	whatever	the	long-term	consequences.			Post-crisis	politics	in	the	advanced	democracies	turns	this	logic	on	its	head.	Faced	with	the	risk	of	deflation,	the	cold	rationality	of	the	experts	and	technocrats	has	produced	 a	 range	 of	 unconventional	 and	 even	 unprecedented	 monetary	measures,	such	as	quantitative	easing	and	negative	interest	rates,	and	some	are	even	hypothesizing	such	unorthodox	ideas	as	helicopter	drops	in	an	attempt	to	shake	 the	 economy	 into	 life.	 In	 contrast	 the	 gut	 instincts	 of	 the	public	 at	 large	appear	 to	 be	 markedly	 pro-cyclical,	 responding	 to	 scarcity	 with	 abnegation.	
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Attempts	to	counter	the	austerity	narrative	have	fallen	flat,	most	notably	when,	in	a	pre-election	 edition	 leaders	 special	 edition	of	 the	BBC	 show	 ‘Question	Time’,	former	UK	Labour	 leader	Ed	Miliband	denied	 that	 the	 financial	 crisis	had	been	caused	by	excessive	government	spending,	to	the	audible	incredulity	of	the	studio	audience.1		This	state	of	affairs	reminds	us	that	material	interests	and	rational	policy	choices	often	have	little	place	in	political	debate.	As	Blyth	(2003)	puts	it,	‘structures	do	not	come	with	an	instruction	sheet’.	The	damaging	effects	of	austerity	on	the	economy	seem	not	 to	 dent	 its	 political	 appeal,	 so	we	 need	 to	 examine	why	 citizens	 and	politicians	articulate	and	receive	economic	ideas	in	the	way	they	do.	One	of	the	key	 features	 of	 Economics	 is	 that	 it	 produces	 a	 form	 of	 knowledge	 which	 is	generally	speaking	hard	for	individuals	who	lack	specific	specialized	training	to	access.	Not	only	is	understanding	Economics	technically	demanding,	developing	a	knowledge	of	Economics	also	has	uncertain	and	 likely	 limited	payoffs.	 In	other	words,	 voters	 are	 advisedly	 ‘cognitive	 misers’	 when	 it	 comes	 to	 gathering	information	about	key	economic	policy	decisions.	Instead,	they	are	more	likely	to	take	their	cue	from	the	pronouncements	of	authoritative	opinion	leaders	whom	they	identify	as	having	their	interests	at	heart,	or	who	simply	sound	plausible.		Traditionally	 in	 democracies	 political	 parties	 have	 played	 this	 role	 for	 many	citizens.	 In	 V.O.	 Key’s	 classic	 definition,	 parties	 ‘perform	 the	 function	 of	 the	articulation	 of	 the	 interests	 and	 aspirations	 of	 a	 substantial	 segment	 of	 the	citizenry’	 (1964:	 9).	 Rather	 than	 having	 to	 make	 laborious	 calculations	 of	 the	benefits	 to	 them	 of	 different	 policy	measures	 themselves,	 voters	 were	 able	 to	
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allow	parties	and	their	candidates	to	define	these	benefits	for	them.	Parties	had	an	interest	in	articulating	stable	and	coherent	sets	of	policies	in	order	to	build	a	reliable	social	constituency	that	would	give	them	both	a	reservoir	of	votes	and	a	supply	of	volunteer	activists	to	maintain	their	organizations	and	stand	for	political	office	under	the	party	banner	(Duverger	1954).	In	the	‘golden	age’	of	parties	many	voters	 identified	 strongly	 with	 a	 particular	 party	 and	 trusted	 that	 party	 to	represent	the	interests	of	people	like	them.	The	classic	‘mass	party’	had	not	only	a	robust	organizational	apparatus	to	root	it	deep	in	the	fabric	of	society,	but	also	a	set	of	ideological	beliefs	that	could	serve	as	a	heuristic	for	voters	in	evaluating	the	likely	consequence	of	different	policy	choices	(von	Beyme	1985).		The	 decline	 of	 the	 mass	 party	 and	 the	 increasing	 individualization	 of	 voter	behaviour	has	undermined	parties’	ability	to	fulfil	this	role	in	the	political	system.	Voters	are	less	likely	to	identify	with	any	party,	join	a	party	as	a	member,	reliably	support	the	same	party,	or	indeed	even	vote	at	all	(Mair	2013,	ch.1).	Parties’	ability	to	define	voters’	interests	for	them	has	declined	as	voters	are	less	likely	to	trust	parties	and	politicians	generally.	The	dominant	models	of	voting	behaviour	in	the	scholarly	literature	see	voters	as	‘consumers’	of	politics,	choosing	between	a	menu	of	 options	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 perceptions	 of	 governing	 competence	 (‘valence’)	(Whiteley	et	al	2013).	The	literature	on	‘cognitive	mobilization’	(Inglehart	1970,	Albright	2009)	associates	these	changes	with	the	emergence	of	a	more	educated	population,	unwilling	to	defer	to	the	authority	of	elites	and	keen	to	express	their	own	opinions	on	political	affairs.		
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Yet	 even	 in	 the	 context	 of	mass	 literacy	 and	 compulsory	 education	 through	 to	adulthood,	most	voters	remain	relatively	unqualified	to	make	such	judgements.	Survey	 data	 routinely	 shows	 that	 the	 average	 citizen	 has	 inconsistent	 and	 ill-informed	views	about	politics,	and	voting	decisions	can	be	swayed	by	random	and	irrelevant	events	(Achen	and	Bartels	2016).	Even	where	citizens	avoid	flatly	false	beliefs,	 they	 have	 difficulty	 thinking	 about	 public	 policy	 problems	 in	 an	appropriate	way.	 Converse	 (1964)	 argued	 that	whilst	well	 informed	 elites	 and	activists	 are	 able	 to	 conceptualize	 policy	 issues	 and	 assess	 alternatives,	 less	informed	 citizens	have	 a	 limited	 ability	 to	 deal	with	 the	 abstract	 concepts	 and	empirical	generalizations	required	in	such	discussions.	Instead,	poorly	educated	citizens	 have	 ‘limited	 horizons’,	 ‘foreshortened	 time	 perspectives’,	 and	 rely	 on	‘concrete	 thinking’	 (Converse	 1964:	 11).	 Whilst	 elites	 can	 have	 relatively	sophisticated	belief	systems	based	on	abstract	concepts,	amongst	less	informed	citizens	 ‘objects	shift	 from	the	remote,	generic,	and	abstract	 to	the	 increasingly	simple,	concrete,	or	“close	to	home"’	(1964:	10).	Whilst	Converse	researched	the	political	beliefs	of	a	less	educated	population	half	a	century	ago,	it	remains	the	case	that	very	often	voters	subscribe	to	views	that	are	demonstrably	false,	and	fail	to	change	 their	minds	when	 exposed	 to	 contrary	 evidence	 (e.g.	 Bartels	 2008).	 As	Caplan	puts	 it,	 ‘voter	 irrationality	 is	the	key	to	a	realistic	picture	of	democracy’	(2007:	3).	More	educated	voters	are	not	 immune	from	irrational	attachment	to	demonstrably	false	beliefs	(Hamilton	2011,	Kahan	and	Corbin	2016).	The	framing	(Chong	 and	 Druckman	 2007)	 of	 political	 issues	 by	 elites	 therefore	 becomes	crucial.		
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The	decline	of	trust	in	political	parties	and	other	collective	institutions	therefore	places	 a	 great	 intellectual	 burden	 on	 citizens,	 a	 burden	 that	 they	 can	 not	 be	expected	to	carry,	not	only	because	of	the	high	costs	of	gathering	and	processing	complex	information	about	politics	and	policy,	but	also	because	in	the	context	of	mass	politics	they	have	no	individual	incentive	to	do	so.	‘Bullshit	is	unavoidable	whenever	 circumstances	 require	 someone	 to	 talk	without	 knowing	what	 he	 is	talking	 about’,	 Frankfurt	 notes	 (2005:	 63).	 ‘Thus	 the	 production	 of	 bullshit	 is	stimulated	whenever	a	person’s	obligations	or	opportunities	to	speak	about	some	topic	exceed	his	knowledge	of	the	facts	that	are	relevant	to	that	topic’	(Frankfurt	2005:	63).	 	Voters	are	placed	precisely	in	this	situation:	they	are	called	upon	to	make	 judgments	 about	 complex	 matters	 they	 understand	 poorly,	 under	unreasonable	time	constraints,	with	no	discernable	consequences	for	error	(at	the	individual	level).	Not	surprisingly,	voters’	political	views	are	likely	to	be	suffused	with	bullshit.		In	 the	 case	of	 austerity,	 ill-informed	voters	 struggling	with	 the	 complexity	 and	abstraction	of	macroeconomics	–	difficulties	trained	economists	themselves	often	fail	to	grasp	–	are	likely	to	shun	abstract	concepts	such	as	aggregate	demand	and	liquidity	 preference	 for	 the	 ‘concrete	 thinking’	 of	 the	household	budget.	 In	 the	household,	 a	 decline	 in	 economic	 activity	 is	 best	 dealt	with	 by	 austerity,	 since	deficits	will	not	have	any	stimulus	effect	on	revenue.	An	inability	to	conceptualize	and	observe	the	economy	as	a	whole	will	 lead	to	the	erroneous	conclusion	that	economy-wide	spending	cuts	are	necessary	in	a	downturn.	Indeed	the	reasoning	may	not	even	be	so	explicitly	causal.	A	recent	YouGov	survey	found	that	more	UK	voters	felt	spending	cuts	were	necessary	than	felt	they	were	good	for	the	economy	
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(Dahlgreen	2015),	suggesting	an	instinctive	or	moralistic	reaction	rather	than	a	considered,	if	misguided,	causal	narrative.	As	Berelson	et	al	argued			 For	 many	 voters	 political	 preferences	 may	 better	 be	 considered	analogous	to	cultural	tastes	…	Both	seem	to	be	matters	of	sentiment	and	 disposition	 rather	 than	 ‘reasoned	 preferences’.	 While	 both	 are	responsive	 to	 changed	 conditions	 and	 unusual	 stimuli,	 they	 are	relatively	 invulnerable	 to	 direct	 argumentation	 and	 vulnerable	 to	indirect	social	influences.	Both	are	characterized	more	by	faith	than	by	conviction	and	by	wishful	expectation	rather	than	careful	prediction	of	consequences.	(Berelson	et	al	1954:	310-311).		Representative	 structures	 such	 as	 political	 parties	 and	 trade	 unions	 have	traditionally	provided	a	solution	to	this	problem.	By	establishing	relations	of	trust	with	 their	social	 constituencies,	 these	organizations	could	use	 their	 intellectual	and	material	resources	to	develop	policy	proposals	in	broader	collective	interests.	Their	ability	to	survive	in	the	long	run	depended	upon	their	success	in	delivering	beneficial	policies	and	convincing	 their	voters/members	of	 that	 success.	 In	 the	absence	 of	 such	 trust-bearing	 institutions,	 citizens	 are	 burdened	 with	 the	responsibility	of	deciding	for	themselves	which	policies	will	benefit	them.	Lacking	the	necessary	resources,	they	will	tend	to	believe	‘common	sense’	stories	rather	than	specialized	knowledge,	creating	an	intellectual	‘market	for	lemons’	(Akerlof	1970).	Bad	 ideas	may	drive	out	good	ones,	 since	 intellectual	and	 informational	asymmetries	make	it	less	likely	that	costly	investments	in	developing	good	ideas	will	pay	off	politically.	
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Austerity	 Politics	 in	 Britain:	 non-partisan	 politics	 in	 defiance	 of	
macroeconomic	common	sense?	
	The	 decline	 of	 political	 ideologies	 and	 the	 organizational	 infrastructure	 that	supported	 them	 has,	we	 argue,	 given	way	 to	 a	 discursive	 free-for-all	 in	which	intellectual	coherence	and	empirical	falsifiability	are	increasingly	absent.	In	this	section	we	examine	the	characteristics	of	political	bullshit	with	a	view	to	laying	some	foundations	for	studying	it	systematically.	To	do	this,	we	focus	on	the	role	played	 by	 bullshit	 in	 the	 domain	 of	macroeconomic	 policy,	 specifically	 around	questions	of	government	debt	and	budget	deficits.	We	focus	on	the	recent	debate	on	deficit	 reduction	 in	 the	UK	 to	 illustrate	 the	 dynamics	 of	 political	 bullshit	 at	work.	Although	 the	more	 spectacular	 cases	of	Donald	Trump	or	 the	Brexiteers	have	captured	the	attention	of	observers	of	post-truth	politics,	we	can	see	clear	evidence	of	the	same	indifference	to	truth	in	the	mainstream	political	consensus	around	deficit	reduction	after	the	financial	crisis	of	the	late	2000s.		For	the	purposes	of	this	section,	we	focus	on	inter-party	politics	in	the	run	up	to	and	in	the	 immediate	aftermath	of	 the	2015	General	Election.	The	election	was	notable	for	returning	a	single	party	Conservative	majority	government	to	office	for	the	first	time	since	1992.	The	most	credible	electoral	analyses	point	to	one	key	variable	found	in	opinion	poll	data	as	the	key	explanation	for	the	election	result:	the	consistent	perception	that	the	Conservative	Party	scored	significantly	higher	on	economic	competence	that	the	rival	Labour	Party	(Reeves,	McKee	and	Stuckler	
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2016).	 The	 Conservatives	 were	 able	 to	 maintain	 an	 advantage	 on	 this	 metric	throughout	the	election	campaign	in	spite	of	inchoate	rhetoric	about	a	‘long	term	economic	 plan’	 and	 the	 apparently	 reckless	 presentation	 of	 uncosted	 (and	seemingly	ad	hoc)	proposals	on	(for	example)	NHS	funding.	This	reputation	for	economic	 competence	 had	 been	 forged	 and	 retained,	 despite	 the	 previous	Conservative-Liberal	 Democrat	 coalition’s	 failure	 to	 meet	 its	 own	 budgetary	targets,	a	record	of	falling	real	wages,	a	proportionate	increase	in	so-called	‘zero-hour	 contract’	 employment,	 a	 failure	 to	 deal	 with	 the	 UK’s	 poor	 productivity	performance	 and	 a	 generalized	 programme	 of	 austerity	 with	 well-publicised	social	costs	(Hopkin	2017).2		Despite	these	prima	facie	favourable	conditions,	during	the	election	campaign	the	Labour	Party	 found	 it	 impossible	 to	shake	off	one	particularly	damaging	claim:	that	the	fiscal	profligacy	of	the	previous	Labour	Government	(which	left	office	in	2010)	had	(a)	left	the	incoming	Con-Lib	Dem	coalition	with	a	ruinous	gap	between	public	 expenditure	 and	 government	 revenues	 and	 (b)	 left	 the	 UK	 economy	especially	 exposed	 to	 the	 effects	 of	 the	 global	 financial	 crisis.	 In	 short,	 the	macroeconomic	 imprudence	of	 those	Labour	governments	had	caused	both	 the	deficit	and	the	crisis.	The	notion	of	‘Labour’s	recession’	became	a	staple	rhetorical	marker	during	the	election	campaign.	The	narrative	of	Labour	profligacy	is	easy	enough	 to	 refute	 (for	 example,	 Skidelsky	 2015,	Wren-Lewis	 2015a),	 yet	 in	 the	immediate	aftermath	of	electoral	defeat	many	in	the	party	seemed	to	concede	that	Labour	 did	 overspend	 and	 that	 under	 Ed	 Miliband’s	 leadership	 it	 became	unnecessarily	unfriendly	to	business.	It	follows,	using	this	line	of	reasoning,	that	acceptance	of	the	mantras	of	‘deficit	fetishism’	(Stiglitz	2010),	and	thus	austerity,	
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would	 be	 central	 and	 necessary	 components	 of	 any	 economic	 strategy	 that	 it	presents	to	the	electorate	in	2020.	Put	another	way,	the	argument	amounted	to	the	claim	that	the	only	way	for	Labour	to	close	the	economic	policy	credibility	gap	with	the	Conservatives	was	to	position	itself	as	a	party	of	fiscal	rectitude,	where	fiscal	rectitude	is	defined	more	or	less	exclusively	in	terms	of	spending	cuts	in	the	pursuit	of	budget	surpluses	and	drastic	reductions	in	the	UK’s	debt	to	GDP	ratio.			The	centrality	of	deficit	fetishism	to	recent	UK	macroeconomic	policy	debate	had	the	effect	of	elevating	the	government	budget	balance	to	the	status	of	key	metric	for	the	assessment	of	aggregate	economic	welfare,	government	competence	and	government	 credibility.	 This	 is	 a	 relatively	 recent	 occurrence,	 and	 there	 is	 an	interesting	 story	 to	 be	 told	 about	 how	 and	 why	 other	 indicators,	 such	 as	 the	current	account	balance,	have	become	much	less	salient	as	indicators	of	economic	health	(Clift	and	Tomlinson	2008).	Indeed,	as	Tony	Dolphin	(2014)	suggested	on	noting	that	the	UK	had	recorded	three	straight	decades	of	current	account	deficits:	‘This	is	a	sign	that	there	is	a	fundamental	flaw	in	the	UK's	economic	model.’	This	may	 be	 true,	 but	 balance	 of	 payments	 data	 is	 no	 longer,	 it	 seems,	 electorally	consequential.	 The	 phrase	 ‘electorally	 consequential’,	 as	 used	 here,	 does	 not	assume	that	incumbent	governments	will	lose	votes	for	poor	performance	on	key	economic	 metrics.	 Rather	 it	 means	 that	 the	 metric	 in	 question,	 the	 debate	surrounding	 it	 and	 the	 repertoire	 of	 analogies	 that	 are	 used	 to	 illustrate	 its	salience	become	key	shapers	of	electoral	politics	and	the	parameters	of	what	is	deemed	possible	in	policy	terms.			
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The	extent	of	deficit	 fetishism	is	perhaps	best	grasped	by	revisiting	the	Labour	Party’s	2015	Election	Manifesto	(Labour	Party	2015).	The	very	first	page	of	the	manifesto	 promised	 a	 ‘Budget	 Responsibility	 Lock’	 –	 an	 assurance	 that	 all	manifesto	 pledges	were	 fully	 costed	 and	 that	 an	 incoming	 Labour	 government	would	legislate	to	ensure	that	all	future	party	manifesto	commitments	would	be	audited	by	the	Office	for	Budget	Responsibility	(OBR).	The	manifesto	contained	two	further	key	passages	designed	to	present	Labour	as	a	party	of	fiscal	rectitude:			 A	Labour	government	will	cut	the	deficit	every	year.	The	first	 line	of	Labour’s	first	Budget	will	be:	‘This	Budget	cuts	the	deficit	every	year’.	This	manifesto	sets	out	that	we	will	only	lay	a	Budget	before	the	House	of	 Commons	 that	 cuts	 the	 deficit	 every	 year,	 which	 the	 OBR	 will	independently	verify.	We	will	get	national	debt	falling	and	a	surplus	on	the	 current	 budget	 as	 soon	 as	 possible	 in	 the	 next	 parliament.	 This	manifesto	sets	out	that	we	will	not	compromise	on	this	commitment.	(Labour	Party	2015:	2)		The	next	Labour	Government	will	balance	the	books.	We	will	only	lay	a	Budget	before	the	House	of	Commons	that	cuts	the	deficit	every	year,	which	the	Office	 for	Budget	Responsibility	will	 independently	verify.	We	will	get	national	debt	falling	and	a	surplus	on	the	current	budget	as	soon	as	possible	in	the	next	Parliament	and	these	fiscal	commitments	will	not	be	compromised.	We	will	tackle	the	root	causes	of	the	deficit	by	building	a	more	productive	economy	with	living	standards	that	rise	year-on-year.	(Labour	Party	2015:	17)		
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	Yet	on	the	day	after	the	election,	a	Financial	Times	headline	read:	‘Ed	Miliband’s	move	 to	 the	 left	 lost	Labour	 the	election’	 (Pickard	2015).3	While	 the	manifesto	didn’t	premise	the	achievement	of	its	fiscal	commitments	purely	on	reductions	in	public	expenditure,4	the	prevailing	assumption	that	deficits	are	to	be	avoided	in	normal	 times,	 is	 indicative	 of	 subscription	 to	 a	 particular	 form	 of	 economic	orthodoxy.	A	primary	indicator	of	this	allegiance	in	the	manifesto	was	the	pledge	to	keep	the	UK’s	rate	of	corporation	tax	as	the	most	competitive	in	the	G7	(Labour	Party	2015:	19).	There	is	strong	evidence	that	corporate	tax	competition	and	the	consequent	 ‘race	 to	 the	 bottom’	 reduces	 the	 capacity	 of	 governments	 to	 raise	revenue	through	progressive	forms	of	personal	taxation	(Ganghof	and	Genschel	2008).	Thus	a	commitment	to	maintaining	company	taxation	at	a	competitively	low	level	could	potentially	erode	revenues	from	personal	taxation	regardless	of	the	marginal	rate.	Under	a	regime	characterized	by	deficit	fetishism,	compromised	revenues	 in	 the	 absence	 of	 expenditure	 cuts	 can	 only	 damage	 a	 government’s	budget	 balance.	 It	 follows	 that	 surpluses	 can	 only	 be	 delivered	 through	expenditure	cuts	or	the	achievement	of	accelerated	growth	(which	spills	over	into	an	improved	tax	take).			Furthermore,	 Labour	 (via	 then	 shadow	Chancellor	Chris	Leslie)	 soon	 indicated	that	it	was	willing	to	support	the	Conservative	government’s	proposal	to	enact	a	so-called	 budget	 surplus	 law	 (Sunday	 Times,	 5	 July	 2015).5	 The	 idea	 of	‘constitutionalizing’	fiscal	rectitude	through	balanced	budget	laws	is	neither	new	nor	 unique	 to	 the	 UK,	 but	 it	 was	 propelled	 to	 the	 top	 of	 the	 political	 agenda	following	 Chancellor	 George	 Osborne’s	 Mansion	 House	 speech	 on	 10	 June	
 22	
(Osborne	2015).,	a	few	weeks	after	the	election.	With	an	appropriately	rhetorical	nod	 in	 the	 direction	 of	 Victorian	 values	 via	 an	 approving	 reference	 to	 the	Commission	 for	 the	 Reduction	 of	 National	 Debt	 that	 last	 met	 in	 1860	 under	Palmerston,	 Osborne	 clarified	 the	 scope	 and	 purpose	 of	 such	 a	measure:	 	 ‘we	should	now	aim	for	a	permanent	change	in	our	political	debate	and	our	approach	to	fiscal	responsibility	–	just	as	they	have	done	in	recent	years	in	countries	like	Sweden	and	Canada.’	(Osborne	2015)6	Claiming	that	the	election	result	of	2015	represented	 the	 ‘comprehensive	 rejection’	 of	 ‘those	 arguing	 for	borrowing	 and	more	spending’,	the	speech	proposed	the	idea	of	a	‘permanent	settlement’:			A	settlement	where	it	is	accepted	across	the	political	spectrum	that:	-	without	sound	public	finances,	there	is	no	economic	security	for	working	people.	-	that	the	people	who	suffer	when	governments	run	unsustainable	deficits	are	not	the	richest	but	the	poorest.	-	and	that	therefore,	in	normal	times,	governments	of	the	left	as	well	as	the	 right	 should	 run	 a	 budget	 surplus	 to	 bear	 down	 on	 debt	 and	prepare	for	an	uncertain	future.	(Osborne	2015,	emphasis	added)		Of	course,	the	idea	is	far	from	uncontroversial	(The	Guardian,	12	June	2015)7	and	analysis	by	 IMF	economists	 (Ostry,	Ghosh	and	Espinoza	2015)	suggests	 that	 in	countries	such	as	the	UK	with	‘fiscal	space’	(essentially	where	the	market	is	happy	to	buy	debt	and	where	default	risk	is	unlikely	to	add	a	premium	to	bond	yields),	there	is	no	drastic	technical	reason	to	reduce	debt	to	GDP	ratios.	Indeed	the	Ostry	
et	al	analysis	goes	further	to	suggest	that	the	costs	of	paying	down	the	debt	are	
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likely	 to	 eclipse	 the	 small	 reduction	 in	 sovereign	 risk.	 As	Wren-Lewis	 (2015b)	points	out,	 in	 the	UK	case	 this	would	 involve	 sustaining	a	debt	 to	GDP	ratio	of	roughly	 80%,	with	 annual	 budget	 deficits	 of	 around	 3%.	 The	 rapid	 erosion	 of	government	 attention	 towards	 the	 deficit	 after	 the	 vote	 to	 leave	 the	 European	Union	in	June	2016	confirms	that	deficit	reduction	was	not	in	fact	the	only	possible	policy.		What	is	interesting	about	this	developing	story	is	the	widening	gap	between	the	tightening	partisan	consensus	around	deficit	fetishism	(at	least	until	the	surprise	election	 of	 Jeremy	 Corbyn	 to	 the	 leadership	 of	 the	 Labour	 Party	 in	 September	2015)	on	the	one	hand	and	the	clear	 indications	that	 the	technical	propriety	of	perpetual	 surplus	 budgeting	 (and	 thus,	 in	 all	 likelihood,	 austerity)	 remains	 a	contested	topic	among	professional	economists.	Deficit	fetishism	may	represent	a	component	 of	 the	 trend	 to	 ‘depoliticisation’	 that	 has	 been	 characteristic	 of	 the	British	politics	 of	 economic	management	over	 recent	decades	 (Burnham	1999,	2001,	2014).	The	text	of	Osborne’s	Mansion	House	speech	quoted	above	conforms	reasonably	well	to	the	central	claims	of	the	depoliticisation	literature	–	that	state	managers	seek	to	remove	aspects	of	economic	policy-making	from	the	arena	of	political	conflict.	Indeed,	deficit	fetishism,	as	understood	here,	was	on	the	brink	of	becoming	politically	non-controversial	in	the	UK	–	at	least	in	terms	of	the	two	main	parties.8	 Also,	 as	 we	 have	 seen,	 deficit	 fetishism	 circumscribes	 the	 range	 of	plausible	policy	instruments	and	inserts	certain	fundamental	barriers	in	the	way	of	developing	economic	policy	alternatives	along	broadly	(neo)Keynesian	lines.			Yet,	 the	dissensus	in	the	economic	blogosphere	is	striking.	Admittedly,	much	of	
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the	critique	of	the	position	taken	by	the	mainstream	political	class	on	deficits	has	been	developed	by	an	assortment	of	centre-left	Keynesians	and	broadly	heterodox	economists.	Even	if	the	professional	economics	commentariat	does	position	itself	on	 this	 issue	 more-or-less	 according	 to	 the	 political	 spectrum,	 then	 it	 is	 still	striking	that	this	has	not	been	the	case	in	terms	of	inter-party	competition.	The	intellectual	 authorization	 of	 deficit	 fetishism	 is	 visible	 and	 traceable.	 Its	importance	in	securing	influence	in	European	policy	circles	(and	its	articulation	with	the	ordoliberal	frames	of	the	EU	macroeconomic	establishment)	should	not	be	forgotten	(Blyth	2013,	Dellepiane-Avellaneda	2015,	Sinclair	1999).	But	non-austerian	alternatives	have	been	readily	available	and,	if	anything,	have	enhanced	their	 position	 since	 the	 onset	 of	 the	 crisis	 (the	 IMF	 being	 perhaps	 the	 most	interesting	site	in	this	regard	–	see	especially	Ban	2015).	The	question	at	hand	is	why	the	balance	(or	at	least	the	contention)	within	the	professional	literature	has	not	translated	into	political	contestation	across	traditional	party	politics?	
The	British	case	discussed	here	seems	to	be	an	exemplar	of	political	bullshit.	For	a	key	period	at	least,	an	easily	contestable	(or	more	or	less	refutable)	set	of	claims	–	about	Labour	profligacy	in	office	and	about	the	need	to	reduce	budget	deficits	and	 public	 debts	 at	 all	 cost	 –	 became	 an	 uncontroversial	 premise	 of	 British	macroeconomic	debate.	This	is	not	just	a	case	of	the	successful	propagation	of	a	particular	narrative	on	one	side	of	the	partisan	divide.	The	real	story	here	is	the	capacity	of	the	dual	claim	(a	mixture	of	historical	assertion	and	a	quasi-technical	view	of	what	is	best	for	the	economy)	to	rhetorically	entrap	the	party	to	whom	that	 very	 claim	 did	 the	most	 damage.	 The	 literature	 on	 rhetorical	 entrapment	reminds	us	that	actors	do	not	have	to	be	persuaded	in	order	to	adopt	a	position	or	
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agree	to	an	outcome	to	which	they	were	hitherto	opposed.	It	is	enough	for	them	to	be	unable	to	argue	against	a	proposition	for	them	to	accede	to	it	(see	Hansen	2006,	 Krebs	 and	 Jackson	 2007,	 Schimmelfennig	 2001).	 Thus	 adding	 political	bullshit	into	the	mix	allows	us	to	posit	situations	where	it	becomes	impossible	to	argue	against	claims	that	have	near	to	zero	veracity.			
The	Age	of	Bullshit:	Political	Discourse	in	the	21st	Century	Understanding	 the	 success	 of	 political	 bullshit	 is	 an	 important	 challenge	 for	political	science,	since	it	is	inconsistent	with	many	of	the	assumptions	of	standard	models,	predicated	as	they	are	on	actors	having	some	connection	with	a	shared	reality.	Here	we	discuss	some	avenues	of	enquiry	that	may	contribute	to	a	better	understanding	 of	 the	 apparent	 growth	 of	 bullshit	 discourses	 in	 the	 advanced	democracies.		The	adoption	of	pro-cyclical	macroeconomic	policies	in	the	UK	after	the	financial	crisis	is	a	particularly	useful	case,	because	we	observe	a	bullshit	political	discourse	justifying	a	political	choice	that	damaged	the	material	interests	of	many	voters,	yet	won	widespread	support.	The	difficulties	of	the	UK	Labour	party	in	winning	broad	support	 for	 an	 alternative	 more	 intellectually	 plausible	 account	 are	 particular	significant	 because	 they	 are	 inconsistent	 with	 past	 experience.	 The	 consensus	view	in	political	economy	in	the	post-war	period	was	that	political	parties	of	the	left	would	favour	expansionary	policies	to	secure	full	employment,	whilst	those	of	the	right	would	prefer	contractionary	policies	to	contain	inflation	(Hibbs	1977).	The	reasons	for	this	were	clear:	those	policies	implied	alternative	distributions	of	gains	 and	 losses	 for	 the	parties’	 respective	 constituencies.	 By	 adopting	 a	more	
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expansionary	approach,	 left	parties	would	improve	the	condition	of	their	 lower	income	voters,	who	were	more	exposed	 to	unemployment	and	 less	exposed	 to	inflationary	risk.		If	UK	Labour	was	unable	to	sustain	such	a	policy	in	the	2010s,	it	was	not	because	its	electorate	no	longer	had	a	shared	interest	in	more	expansionary	policy:	Labour	MPs	 continue	 to	 represent	 the	 regions	 of	 the	UK	with	 the	 lowest	 incomes	 and	highest	 unemployment.	 So	 we	 need	 to	 examine	 other	 reasons	 why	 political	bullshit	appealed	so	strongly	to	British	voters,	and	why	Labour	found	it	so	difficult	to	push	back	against	it.		There	 are	 perhaps	 two	 related	 lines	 of	 argument	 might	 seek	 to	 explain	 why	debt/deficit	bullshit	has	been	so	successful	 in	 the	UK.	The	 first,	advanced	most	forcefully	by	Wren-Lewis,	concerns	the	role	of	the	media	reproducing	particularly	corrosive	 forms	of	economic	 illiteracy	–	of	which	 the	 idea	 that	deficits	are	 ipso	facto	 ‘bad’	 is	a	strong	example.	 Indeed	he	has	coined	 the	 term	 ‘mediamacro’	 to	describe	the	particular	way	of	narrating	the	economy	associated	with	(especially)	the	 broadcast	 media.	 He	 defines	 mediamacro	 as	 ‘a	 set	 of	 ideas	 about	macroeconomics	promulgated	by	the	media	that	seem	very	different	to	the	macro	taught	to	economic	students’	(Wren-Lewis	2015c).9	Mediamacro	does	not	work	in	isolation	 from	 the	 political	 sphere,	 and	 it	 is	 here	 that	 perhaps	we	 can	 see	 the	performative	aspects	of	political	bullshit:			 What	we	get	as	a	result	is	a	bias	against	the	facts.	In	the	case	of	Labour	and	the	deficit,	because	Labour	chose	fatefully	not	to	challenge	the	Conservatives	
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on	this,	the	media	takes	this	as	confirmation	that	it	must	be	true	rather	than	checking	the	facts	themselves,	or	shy	away	from	presenting	the	facts	because	that	would	be	seen	as	‘too	political’.	Myth	then	becomes	a	fact	that	even	some	Labour	MPs	start	believing,	and	when	someone	actually	stands	up	for	the	facts	they	are	assumed	to	be	dishonest	or	a	slightly	mad	professor.	(Wren-Lewis	2016)		The	second	line	of	argument	would	ponder	why	some	bullshit	claims	are	better	placed	to	secure	traction	than	others.	In	this	respect,	the	festishization	of	deficits	as	 ‘bad’	taps	somewhat	successfully	into	a	particular	type	of	folk	wisdom	about	the	economy	–	the	more	or	less	straightforward	analogization	of	an	economy	(in	the	case	of	the	UK,	a	monetary	sovereign)	with	a	household.	Needless	to	say,	using	household	 debt	 as	 a	 metaphor	 for	 sovereign	 debt	 is	 an	 egregious	 fallacy	 of	composition	(Krugman	2013,	Matthews	2013).	But	ideas	such	as	‘maxing	out’	the	‘national	credit	card’	(see,	 for	example,	The	Times	15	September	201510),	while	meaningless	to	economists,	offer	a	clear	and	time-efficient	tool	for	translating	a	particular	view	of	economic	propriety	into	public	discourse.			However	it	is	not	clear	why	these	factors	work	so	much	more	strongly	today	than	in	 the	 post-war	 period,	 when	 Hibbs	 observed	 a	 clear	 political	 debate	 around	distinct	 and	 plausible	 macroeconomic	 theories	 between	 the	 major	 political	parties.	 What	 has	 changed,	 we	 suggest,	 is	 that	 the	 fundamental	 shifts	 in	 the	political	economy	of	advanced	democracies	since	the	1970s	have	both	stripped	political	parties	of	their	power	to	decide	policy,	and	therefore	weakened	them	as	carriers	 of	 coherent	 ideologies	 and	 policy	 programmes.	 In	 this	 post-party	
 28	
environment	(which	Colin	Crouch	[2004]	describes	as	 ‘post-democracy’),	policy	decisions	are	the	preserve	of	unelected	technocrats	such	as	central	bankers,	and	elected	politicians	not	 only	 can	do	 little	 to	 influence	 the	 fundamental	 levers	of	policy,	 but	 also	 believe	 that	 their	 job	 is	 to	 intervene	 as	 little	 as	 possible	 in	economic	management.			This	promotes	the	success	of	political	bullshit	in	two	main	ways.	First,	the	futility	of	supporting	political	parties	whose	purpose	is	no	longer	to	manage	the	state	to	the	benefit	of	broad	social	interests,	but	instead	is	to	promote	the	political	careers	of	 party	 officeholders	 and	 aspirant	 officeholders,	 weakens	 the	 connection	between	 voters,	 activists	 and	 the	 party	 leaders.	 As	 a	 result,	 party	 machines	become	increasingly	distant	 from	the	social	 interests	they	notionally	represent,	and	more	reluctant	to	express	clear	identifiable	policy	positions	(Katz	and	Mair	1995,	Blyth	and	Katz	2004).	Second,	when	the	main	policy	decisions	are	driven	by	technocratic	rationales	or	constrained	by	the	pressures	of	financial	markets,	the	pay-off	for	developing	concrete	policy	proposals	diminishes,	whilst	the	pay-off	for	producing	inoffensive	or	vaguely	plausible	bullshit	discourses	remains	intact:	bad	ideas	drive	out	the	good.		But	we	can	go	further	and	suggest	that	there	is	an	intimate	relationship	between	the	 hollowing	 out	 of	 democracy	 described	 by	 Mair	 and	 others	 and	 the	 very	discourse	 that	 is	 used	 to	 underpin	 austerity.	 The	 intellectual	 antecedents	 of	austerity	 thinking	 (time	 inconsistency,	 public	 choice	 critiques	 of	 government	overload,	 Bocconi	 school	 thinking	 on	 fiscal	 deficits	 etc)	 are	 also	 inherently	suspicious	 of	 democratic	 contestation,	 and	 popular	 intervention	 in	 the	
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management	 of	 the	 economy	 more	 generally.	 One	 of	 the	 ways	 in	 which	 this	skeptical	 view	 of	 government	 economic	 interventionism	 plays	 out	 is	 in	 its	reluctance	to	accept	the	kinds	of	expertise	which	underpins	policies	designed	to	make	 the	 economy	 work	 more	 efficiently	 and	 equitably.	 Hostility	 to	 scientific	discourse	about	the	economic,	and	resort	instead	to	the	homely	bullshit	of	sound	money,	protection	of	property	and	 free	market	exchange	 is	an	effective	way	of	generating	support	for	policies	which	may	not	be	in	the	broad	public	interest,	but	which	appeal	to	broad	public	sentiments.		
Conclusions		In	this	paper	we	have	argued	that	there	is	a	connection	between	the	simultaneous	rise	of	bullshit	in	political	discourse	and	the	rise	of	austerity	and	deficit	fetishism	as	the	dominant	feature	of	macroeconomic	policy,	and	that	the	rise	of	bullshit	(and	thus	 of	 austerity	 policies)	 is	 rooted	 in	 the	 broader	 hollowing	 out	 of	 western	democratic	politics.	Political	parties	seem	less	connected	to	their	electorates	and	less	likely	to	develop	clear	ideological	and	policy	positions	which	appeal	to	their	voters	 and	 allow	 them	 to	 defend	 their	 interests.	 This	 is	 a	 function	 of	 parties’	declining	 ability	 to	 use	 policy	 levers	 in	 favour	 of	 their	 electorates	 due	 to	 the	success	of	neoliberal	reformers	in	entrenching	the	depoliticization	of	key	policy-making	powers	and	removing	large	areas	of	economic	policy	from	the	sphere	of	political	debate.	The	 ‘hollowing	out’	of	democracy	described	by	Peter	Mair	has	made	 clear	 ideological	 statements	 less	 profitable	 for	 parties,	 leading	 to	 party	competition	 revolving	 increasingly	around	bullshit	discourse	as	 the	payoffs	 for	developing	 sound	policy	decline	and	bad	 ideas	–	 in	a	kind	of	Gresham’s	 law	of	
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ideational	contestation11	-	drive	out	good.		Our	 argument	 here	 	 poses	 a	 challenge	 to	 political	 science.	 As	 well	 as	 taking	seriously	the	ways	in	which	ideas	and	discourses	shape	social	interests,	we	also	need	to	consider	that	much	political	discourse	is	meaningless	and	unfalsifiable:	in	short,	 it	 is	 bullshit.	 We	 arrive	 at	 a	 situation	 where	 voters	 are	 not	 simply	overwhelmed	with	information;	much	of	that	information	is	bullshit,	and	voters’s	capacities	 to	 distinguish	 plausible	 truth	 claims	 from	 bullshit	 is	 severely	compromised.	This	problem	is	not	restricted	to	the	discourses	of	contemporary	populists	 such	 as	 Donald	 Trump;	 indeed	 our	 focus	 has	 been	 the	 apparently	technocratic	and	‘responsible’	claims	of	the	elite	consensus	that	preceded	what	is	often	 described	 as	 ‘post-truth	 politics’.	 Developing	 the	 tools	 to	 observe	 and	understand	the	origins	and	uses	of	political	bullshit	should	become	a	priority.					
Notes	1. See	http://www.telegraph.co.uk/comment/letters/11578326/Ed-Miliband-loses-credibility-by-refusing-to-admit-that-the-last-Labour-government-overspent.html	[accessed	18	May	2017]	and	http://blogs.spectator.co.uk/coffeehouse/2015/04/milibands-refusal-to-admit-that-labour-overspent-could-cost-him-dear/	[accessed	18	May	2017]	
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2. A	significant	improvement	in	the	Tories’	rating	for	economic	competence	appeared	to	coincide	with	the	retreat	from	strict	austerity	budgeting	in	2013.	See	http://www.theguardian.com/politics/2013/aug/12/guardian-icm-poll-tories-economic-confidence	[accessed	18	May	2017]	3. Tony	Blair	had	said	much	the	same	six	months	earlier:	http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2891948/Miliband-Left-wing-win-election-says-Blair.html	[accessed	18	May	2017]	4. The	manifesto	also	promised	a	rise	in	the	marginal	rate	of	personal	taxation	for	the	highest	earners	(a	return	to	the	50p	rate)	and	a	generalised	crackdown	on	tax	avoidance.	5. http://www.thesundaytimes.co.uk/sto/news/uk_news/article1577182.ece?CMP=OTH-gnws-standard-2015_07_05	[accessed	18	May	2917]	6. On	Sweden	and	the	Social	Democrat-led	government’s	wish	to	relax	the	budget	surplus	target:	http://www.wsj.com/articles/sweden-seeks-to-drop-budget-surplus-target-1425379037	(Wall	Street	Journal,	3	March	2015)	[accessed	18	May	2017].		7. http://www.theguardian.com/politics/2015/jun/12/osborne-plan-has-no-basis-in-economics	[accessed	18	May	2017]	8. Aggressive	deficit	reduction	targets	were	also	outlined	in	the	UKIP	Manifesto	(UKIP	2015:	8-9).	The	Liberal	Democrat	manifesto	(Liberal	Democrats	2015)	spoke	in	rather	less	precise	terms	about	reducing	the	deficit	’fairly’.	But	there	was	no	question	that	annual	deficits	should	be	eliminated	and	debt	to	GDP	ratios	should	be	reduced	significantly.			
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9. Wren-Lewis	suggests	further	that	media	macro	tends	to	be	the	work	of	political	journalists	rather	than	trained	economics	correspondents.	10. http://www.thetimes.co.uk/tto/news/politics/article4557053.ece	[accessed	18	May	2017]	11. We	are	grateful	to	one	of	the	anonymous	referees	for	this	suggestion.			
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